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Abstract 
 
 
Economics and culture have usually been kept apart in academic discussion.  
The resulting division is damaging to economics, since important cultural 
questions such as the formation of preferences, the influence of ideology and 
the relation between the individual and society are systematically neglected.  
Outside economics, however, anthropologists and literary theorists have 
formulated a 'cultural materialism' that seeks to reintegrate culture with the 
material world.  This paper argues that the cultural materialist perspective has 
strong affinities with institutional economics and can provide a framework for a 
more culturally sensitive approach to economic theorising. 
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Introduction 
 
Academic discussion of culture has traditionally been separated from discussion of 
economics.  Culture, according to some definitions, is concerned with the higher arts 
enjoyed by a minority of the population, whereas economics deals with the everyday 
business of life experienced by all.  Other definitions of culture broaden it out to cover the 
whole way of life of a society.  Even on the broader definitions, culture is often treated as if 
it can be confined to an immaterial, idealist realm that has little to do with economics.  The 
implication is that economics can be discussed without reference to culture and culture 
without reference to economics. 
 
    Neoclassical economic theory has diverted the attention of economists away from 
culture.  Individualistic, rational-choice theorising obscures the role of culture in shaping 
individual preferences.  Efficient, market-clearing equilibria, supposedly relevant to all 
times and places, are at odds with the emphasis of cultural theorists on history and social 
context.  An ahistorical, timeless theory overlooks the parts played by culture in moulding 
individual behaviour and by individuals in reproducing social institutions.  Neoclassical 
economics consists of a permanent set of theoretical abstractions that keep economic 
theorising apart from cultural issues.  
 
    Economics is also kept apart from culture in non-neoclassical economics, albeit to a 
lesser degree.  Marxian economics, for example, takes a materialist view which in its more 
stringent versions tends to make culture subservient to economics.  A Marxian approach is, 
nevertheless, more amenable than neoclassicism to cultural ideas: it avoids individualistic 
reductionism and insists on the historically specific nature of economics.  Some Marxian 
authors have sought to redress the balance between economics and culture and replace 
'economism' with a more complex interplay between culture and the economy.  Similar 
attempts to introduce cultural ideas into economic discussion have been made by 
institutional economists.  Although the distancing of economics from culture has been 
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widespread in both neoclassical and non-neoclassical economics, many heterodox 
economists have long argued for the importance of culture. 
 
    Outside economics, cultural theorists too have sought to reconcile economics and 
culture.  The traditional approach to culture, mirroring the approach to economics, treats 
culture as a realm separate from the economy.  Cultural theorising has been undertaken on 
idealist principles that uphold an anti-naturalism dividing the social sciences from the 
natural sciences.  In recent years, anthropologists and cultural theorists have made efforts to 
break down this division.  The notion of 'cultural materialism' seeks to reintegrate culture 
with the same material, natural world as economics.  From a cultural materialist viewpoint 
all of everyday life, including economic activities, is cultural and reproduced by material 
means; culture and economics are no longer separable.  The aim of this paper is to point out 
the common ground between cultural materialism and institutional economics.  In the next 
three sections the culture/economics division and the modern growth of the cultural 
materialist viewpoint are considered in more detail.  Discussion then moves on to the 
treatment of culture in institutional economics and the relevance of cultural materialism to 
economic theorising. 
 
 
 
The separation of culture from economics 
 
The concept of culture predates modern economics.  The first cultural theorist is thought to 
have been Vico, who wrote in the early eighteenth century, well before the arrival of 
classical economics (Berlin 1976).  Vico's New Science was a critique of Enlightenment 
thought as extended to the study of human behaviour and a manifesto for a new science of 
the humanities.  According to Vico, human beings can never obtain a proper understanding 
of nature.  Since they did not create nature, they must always be outsiders, observing and 
perhaps manipulating some facets of nature, but never attaining a true, internal 
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comprehension.  Human beings have created society, however, and so are in a position to 
understand the subject matter of the humanities.  The appropriate methods are 
interpretative: investigators should try to empathise with human agents and understand their 
behaviour.  This yields a division between the natural sciences and the humanities: the 
former adopt empirical or rationalist methods and the latter adopt interpretative methods.  
The anti-naturalistic division has characterised most subsequent cultural writings.   
 
    Culture as a formal concept is associated with the idealism of classical German 
philosophy.  The German cultural tradition, in common with the work of Vico, was a 
reaction against the Enlightenment (Berlin 1979).  At first the intention was only to qualify 
Enlightenment thought, by putting certain metaphysical and ethical issues beyond the 
bounds of the natural sciences.  Later writers went on to advocate alternative methods, with 
the intention of either filling gaps left by the Enlightenment or challenging the 
Enlightenment as a whole.  Herder, who has been seen as the first of the German cultural 
philosophers, argued for a relativistic stance: human societies can be understood only 
through empathising with the members of the particular culture being investigated (Berlin 
1976).  Transplanting the methods of the natural sciences to the study of human societies 
can add little to our understanding.  Similar sentiments have been expressed by many 
authors since Herder.  The different versions of German cultural philosophy have given 
different roles to culture, varying from a relevance to the humanities alone to a universal 
relevance to human knowledge.  All the versions are a reaction against the naturalism of the 
Enlightenment. 
 
    The academic social sciences have never been very receptive to cultural thought: they 
were established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on a positivistic basis 
that led to a neglect of cultural ideas and a concentration on empirical methods.  Cultural 
ideas were not eclipsed altogether, but they became a minority interest.  In the prevailing 
climate of positivism, social scientists could adopt cultural, interpretative methods only at 
the expense of relinquishing their status as scientists.  Most social scientists in the twentieth 
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century have played safe and chosen to mimic natural scientists, a choice which no doubt 
arose largely from intellectual conviction, but which may have been encouraged by 
practical considerations: it has been easier to gain recognition and funding for 'hard' 
sciences that generate 'factual', 'value-free' knowledge.  A few social scientists have 
persevered with cultural methods: the more Weberian, interpretative strands in sociology 
are an example.  On the whole, however, the writers who have kept faith with cultural ideas 
in the twentieth century have stood outside the mainstream of social science. 
 
    Economics, in its mainstream (classical and neoclassical) guises, has sided with natural 
science and distanced itself from cultural ideas.  This was true right from the beginnings of 
classical economics, although the Ricardian model does at least acknowledge that the 
economy is structured through the existence of economic classes.  Modelling dwells on 
growth rather than resource allocation, so theory takes a dynamic (if not entirely historical) 
approach.  The structural and dynamic features of classical economics are in line with 
cultural theorising, but the same cannot be said of the aims of classical economics.  The 
theory claims to portray a universal pattern of economic development and, despite its 
dynamic form, is ahistorical in its reluctance to tie itself down to particular historical 
circumstances.  The Ricardian reliance on universal laws such as the Malthusian population 
principle is inconsistent with a cultural perspective.  In the early nineteenth century, the 
political economists were on the utilitarian, bourgeois, scientific side of social and political 
debate; against them were ranged the romantic, conservative, cultural arguments of various 
literary critics and social commentators.  The cultural critique of capitalism and classical 
economics raised issues that remain important today (Jackson 1993).  Most economists, 
both at the time and since, have been oblivious of the cultural critique and chosen to pursue 
the goal of natural scientific status, regardless of the limitations this has imposed on their 
work. 
 
    The breach with cultural ideas was consolidated by the growth of neoclassical economics 
in the late nineteenth century.  The cultural features of classical economics were dropped: 
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theory became static and timeless, and the economic classes and factor shares were 
supplanted by a thoroughgoing individualism.  Neoclassical theory took up the 
universalistic aspect of classical economics and abandoned the more structural and 
historical aspects.  This contrasts with the Marxian inheritance from classical economics; 
Marxian theory persisted with the structural and historical aspects and abandoned the 
universality.  It is debatable which of the aspects is more central to classical economics, but 
the self-image of classical economists was of 'hard' scientists enunciating fundamental 
truths about all economies.  The same goes for present-day neoclassical economics; the 
increased use of mathematics has enhanced the 'hardness' of the discipline.  A few of the 
many theoretical elaborations of the neoclassical model touch upon cultural issues: 
examples are the recent attention given to information, expectations and uncertainty.  But 
the core concepts of neoclassical economics - rational-choice individualism and market-
clearing equilibrium - are still in place and they are, as ever, anti-cultural.  While these core 
concepts hold sway over economic theorising, the prospect of cultural ideas being fully 
absorbed into economics is slender.  The best hopes for a culturally informed economics lie 
with a combination of heterodox economics and noneconomic perspectives. 
 
    A number of writers on culture have made a conscious attempt to draw together cultural 
and economic considerations and work towards a materialist account of culture.  This 
'cultural materialism' exists in two main versions, one derived from anthropology, the other 
from literary studies.  Both versions are potentially of interest to economic theorists and 
worth discussing in more detail. 
 
 
 
Cultural materialism: the anthropological version 
 
Culture is a core concept for anthropologists, and their definition of culture is broader than 
that of literary authors and philosophers.  In anthropological writings, culture usually 
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denotes the whole way of life of a society, not merely artistic activities.  It follows that 
economic behaviour, along with everything else, has a cultural side and that the work of 
anthropologists should be relevant to economics.  Anthropology, like economics, has 
aspired to scientific status and imitated the positivistic methods of the natural sciences; 
despite its drawbacks, this has helped to discourage anti-naturalism and reinforce the idea 
that culture is rooted in the natural, material world.  An advantage of the anthropological 
view of culture is that it is free from the idealist vice of consigning culture to a separate 
realm away from economic activities.  The general drift of anthropology is to pull culture 
down into the material world and, in so far as it accomplishes this, it can contribute to a 
weakening of the culture/economics division. 
 
    Much anthropological work has been explicitly materialist in character, with the 
objective of showing how human behaviour depends on material circumstances.  Early 
materialist approaches identified stages in human history, which were marked by increasing 
technical knowledge and more successful exploitation of the natural environment.  The tone 
of discussion was evolutionary and normative, so that industrialised capitalist societies 
were seen as the end result of a long historical process of civilisation.  A prime exponent of 
this approach was the American anthropologist Lewis Morgan, whose writings were 
thought by Engels to confirm the Marxian account of social and economic evolution 
(Engels 1891).  The affinity between evolutionary anthropology and the Marxian, 
materialist account of culture was clear.  Morgan's work was well attuned to 
late-nineteenth-century versions of Marxism, with their mechanistic interpretations of the 
base-superstructure model, although it seems to have been more reductive than Marx's own 
views on culture.  In the twentieth century, anthropology has distanced itself from Marxian 
theory.  The emphasis has switched from evolutionary anthropology to a 'cultural 
anthropology' that compares cultures at a single time, instead of tracing the development of 
cultures over time.  The comparative stance has been static and non-judgemental, and its 
main protagonists (such as Boas in the United States and Malinowski in the UK) have 
turned away from Marxian, materialist approaches.  Cultural anthropologists have mostly 
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either avoided large-scale theorising and generalisation or, when they have used theory, 
taken an individualistic view.  The relativising of anthropology has led to a more 
descriptive approach, in which empirical methods are preferred to theory and the precise 
nature of the relation between behaviour and material conditions is left unspecified. 
 
    Some anthropologists have sought to restore the ties with materialism and with Marxian 
thinking in general.  Marvin Harris introduced the term 'cultural materialism' in the 1960s 
to describe his explicitly materialist outlook (Harris 1968); he later produced a full account 
of the aims, character and method of cultural materialism (Harris 1979).  The motivation 
behind cultural materialism, as its name implies, is to demonstrate that all cultures are 
adapted to, and explicable through, their material environment.  Cultures may be 
differentiated by geographical region, with no universal pattern of development, but in all 
cases the evolution of a culture is determined by the ability to cope with the challenges of 
the material world.  The approach is evolutionary and materialist, while maintaining the 
relativism of cultural anthropology.  This, according to Harris, preserves what is valuable in 
Marxism and discards the rest.  Cultural materialism is supposed to distil Marxism to yield 
a scientific analysis of culture that lacks the political message of Marx.  There is no 
prediction that human history must progress through a sequence of stages culminating in 
the overthrow of capitalism and the onset of communism.  Although human societies are 
accepted as continuously evolving, the belief that this always entails improvement and the 
working out of a grand scheme is rejected.  Harris also questions the value of the Marxian 
dialectic, which is dismissed as an obscurantist, politically tendentious notion unsuited to a 
properly scientific approach.  In the Marxian dialectic, ideas and values interact with 
economic forces, and the tensions between them are vital to human progress.  Material 
considerations must dominate in the long run, yet the imperfect adaptation of ideas and 
values to their environment is a crucial determinant of evolution.  In Harris's non-dialectical 
approach, this imperfect adaptation receives little credence and discussion concentrates on 
the closeness of the match between human behaviour and its material environment.  Harris 
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regards cultural materialism as a purer form of materialism than the Marxian dialectical 
version and a plainer attempt to provide a materialist basis for the study of given cultures. 
 
    Cultural materialism has been criticised by both anthropologists and Marxian writers.  
Other schools of thought in anthropology have given a higher status to ideas and allowed 
them greater autonomy from material concerns.  Structuralist anthropology is founded on 
the universal, immaterial structures of language; it searches for the deep structures 
underlying all human societies, irrespective of their material environment.  Structuralism 
and its structural Marxist offshoots have a more idealist slant than cultural materialism, 
along with a more rationalist method.  Sahlins (1976), for example, has criticised cultural 
materialism for failing to notice the potential autonomy of ideas and beliefs and thereby 
underestimating the significance of ideology.  Ideas and beliefs can be self-sustaining, even 
if they are false and poorly matched to the material environment.  Cultural materialism 
risks being too materialist if it can envisage only material explanations of behaviour.  Other 
anthropologists have gone further and argued for an interpretative anthropology that draws 
upon the more literary and philosophical conceptions of culture (Geertz 1973).  The 
appropriate methods are no longer the systematic recording of behaviour and material 
conditions, but the interpretative understanding of human behaviour in its social context.  
Anthropologists require a more active involvement in their ethnographical research, and 
have to be wary of general theoretical structures.  In the anti-naturalistic division between 
the natural and social sciences, anthropology is now grouped with the interpretative social 
sciences and has little to gain from imitating natural science.  The traditional materialist 
basis of anthropology is rejected in favour of a more idealist and anthropocentric viewpoint. 
 
    Cultural materialism has also been criticised from more conventional Marxian, 
materialist positions (Bloch 1983).  The abandoning of the dialectic can be seen as a 
downgrading of human consciousness and a reversion to a less flexible, more deterministic 
binding of behaviour to the environment.  Unless the frictions between consciousness and 
economic forces are recognised, the possibility of a mismatch between the social and 
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natural environments may be overlooked.  The unified, non-dialectical approach will tend 
to create a bottom-up mode of analysis in which the current, unchanging material 
environment is always dominant.  The relativism acquired from cultural anthropology 
means that cultural materialist explanations will frequently be ad hoc arguments relating a 
specific culture to its specific circumstances.  Since the Marxian evolutionary scheme is not 
replaced by any other scheme, the cultural materialist view lacks generality and achieves 
little beyond fragmentary description of particular cases.  It is too static to be able to 
account for economic changes and seems better suited to primitive, small-scale societies 
than modern industrial economies.  The non-dialectical materialism is, arguably, a return to 
the pre-dialectical, pre-Marxist materialism that Marx wanted to replace: its relevance, for 
classical Marxists, is confined to pre-dialectical societies that precede the formation of 
economic classes.  Again, as with the structuralist and interpretative critiques, cultural 
materialism is accused of undervaluing ideas and human consciousness; its approach may 
not be deterministic, but it is one-sided and oversimplified. 
 
    In response to the various criticisms, Harris (1979) argues that cultural materialism was 
deliberately designed to be non-reductionist and that it gives due weight to the influence of 
ideas on economic conditions.  Ideas can interact with economic conditions, although the 
interaction does not take the dialectical form ascribed to it by classical Marxists.  
Dialectics, for Harris, are allied to a Marxian political position, and he hopes to remove the 
Marxian politics without losing the possibility of ideas being mismatched with material 
circumstances.  Whether cultural materialism, in Harris's version, can successfully 
accommodate a true interaction between ideas and material circumstances is open to 
debate.  To the extent that consciousness is permitted to have a separate existence, the rift 
between cultural materialism and its critics is narrowed.  The difference is not in the basic 
intentions of the theorists, given that all of them are happy to concede the importance of 
consciousness, but in the details of their research methods and analyses of particular cases.  
Harris (1979) sets out an empirically based research programme that goes beyond the basic 
conception of a materialist view of culture; one could still be a cultural materialist without 
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subscribing to all of Harris's recommended methods (and, for that matter, without being an 
anthropologist).  The most significant items in Harris's cultural materialist package are the 
ones underlying its view of human societies: the pivotal influence of culture on human 
behaviour and the fact that culture is embedded within a broader material nature.  Most of 
the materialist critics of cultural materialism would be able to agree with these, 
notwithstanding their disagreement with other elements of Harris's work.  The value of 
cultural materialism is not so much in its providing a specific approach to anthropology as 
in its setting out a more general social-scientific framework that upholds the centrality of 
culture but insists on it not being disengaged from material nature.  The cultural materialist 
framework has a relevance extending far beyond the traditional subject matter of cultural 
anthropology.  A striking instance of this is the way in which a very similar notion of 
cultural materialism has arisen independently in the very dissimilar field of literary studies. 
 
 
 
Cultural materialism: the literary version 
 
Literary and philosophical accounts of culture differ from anthropological accounts in 
being more idealist and anti-naturalistic.  Their definition of culture is apt to concentrate on 
artistic activities instead of a whole way of life.  They have been less anxious to assert the 
unity of the sciences and have preferred to ally themselves with the humanities, rather than 
the natural sciences.  The idealist stance has the drawback of restricting itself to a realm of 
ideas and beliefs separate from the material world: cultural matters are discussed without 
worrying about the economy, and discussion of the economy is left to the economists.  
Such a dualistic attitude has strengthened the traditional culture/economics division and 
been a barrier to a full understanding of both culture and economics.  The attempt to 
provide an alternative, materialist approach to culture has, as in anthropology, been closely 
connected with Marxian thinking.  By rejecting idealism and giving attention for the first 
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time to popular as well as higher culture, it has produced its own, literary version of cultural 
materialism. 
 
    Modern materialist analyses of higher and popular culture were initially inspired by the 
New Left of the late 1950s and 1960s.  New Left writers wanted to find a critical mode of 
analysis that offered an alternative to the ideologies of the Cold War.  Dissatisfaction with 
both the individualistic, market-centred doctrines of the West and the structural central 
planning of the East encouraged a search for different perspectives.  Culture became a 
focus of New Left discussion because, as the link between individuals and society, it can 
overcome the opposition of individual agency and social structure.  A better appreciation of 
cultural issues can help to break down the dualism engendered by the mainstream social 
science of the Cold War period.  The British New Left started in the late 1950s with the 
work of Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson and Stuart Hall, who stood outside the 
mainstream social sciences.  Culture, according to these authors, is pervasive; it covers all 
areas of life, including the ones normally termed economic and non-cultural.  The old 
separation of high culture from everyday life is misleading and obscures cultural issues; the 
way forward is to transcend the boundaries between academic disciplines and extend 
cultural discussion into areas not hitherto regarded as cultural.  Early New Left writings had 
their origins in literary studies and history, as opposed to the academic social sciences.  
This reflects the idealist cultural tradition, but New Left writings took a materialist line, 
either explicitly through Marxian arguments or implicitly through their acceptance of the 
'ordinariness' of culture and its relevance to everyday material concerns. 
 
    The limited theoretical content of New Left thinking was rectified in the 1960s and 
1970s by the introduction of social theory derived from Marxian and other non-mainstream 
sources.  Some New Left beliefs had been anticipated by earlier Marxian writers, notably 
the members of the Frankfurt School writing in the 1920s and 1930s.  Authors such as 
Benjamin and Adorno had provided a materialist analysis of modern culture and a 
culturally based critique of positivism.  They did not fully anticipate the New Left, 
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however: their writings kept largely to high culture and lacked the generality of New Left 
arguments.  A broader view of culture was available from the work of Gramsci which, 
while written in the 1920s and 1930s, only became widely known in the late 1960s and 
1970s.  Gramsci, unlike the Frankfurt School, made clear the relevance of culture to the 
whole way of life of a society; the range of his discussion equals that of the anthropological 
definition of culture.  The Frankfurt School and Gramsci, along with other Marxian writers 
such as Lukács and Korsch, constitute a humanist Marxism which is informed by Marx's 
early writings and emphasises the continuities between Marxian thinking and the idealism 
of classical German philosophy (Bottomore 1984).  Humanist Marxism has always been 
controversial because of its downgrading of Marx's later, more structural writings. 
 
    An alternative to humanist Marxism is the structural Marxism that became popular in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Structuralism is congenial to New Left thinking through its stress on 
socially structured behaviour and its opposition to individualistic reductionism.  In other 
respects it is less congenial: a structural analogy fosters static theorising, which gives only a 
narrow scope for historical change and individual or collective agency.  Althusser's 
structuralist Marxism allows the cultural and ideological superstructure to have 'relative 
autonomy' from the material production base (Althusser 1969).  The influence of culture 
and ideology on individual behaviour is enhanced, but only by means of a theoretical 
structure that denies most of the possibilities for human agency and historical change.  A 
static, structurally dominated analysis is substituted for a historical view of culture 
(Thompson 1978).  Structuralist approaches have created a culturalist/structuralist division 
in cultural theorising: the 'culturalists' have stuck to the older definitions of culture and 
been suspicious of structuralism, whereas the 'structuralists' have been happy to take 
structuralism as their theoretical framework (Hall 1980).  The division shows the 
difficulties of finding a definitive theory to encapsulate the idea of culture.  This need not 
imply that culture is incompatible with theory, merely that one has to beware of becoming 
wedded to general theoretical systems omitting key features of reality. 
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    Much of the contemporary discussion of culture by social scientists is located in a 
separate discipline of 'cultural studies', with LWV RZQ VXE-GLVFLSOLQHV 
PHGLD
VWXGLHV
ࡋcommunications studies' and so forth).  The approach most commonly taken in 
cultural studies is a descendant of the New Left viewpoint and compatible with the 
anthropological definition of culture: it recognises that the whole of everyday life is cultural 
and proposes to investigate the popular culture ignored by the traditional academic 
disciplines.  Establishing cultural studies as a formal academic discipline is a mixed 
blessing.  The cordoning off of popular culture as a separate field of study is somewhat 
artificial and reminiscent of the cordoning off of high culture which the New Left was 
trying to avoid.  On the other hand, a separate discipline of cultural studies has secured 
academic attention for cultural matters: the discipline is currently fashionable and seems 
likely to continue to grow.  Most of the practical applications of cultural studies are directed 
towards the arts and raise economic issues only if they impinge on cultural production.  But 
the prospective subject matter of cultural studies is broader than this and includes all types 
of production and consumption, not just those earmarked as popular culture.   
 
    Cultural studies generally takes the 'cultural materialism' of Raymond Williams as its 
theoretical foundation (Williams 1977, 1981).  Williams's own work had begun in Culture 
and Society by recording and evaluating the cultural critique of capitalism (Williams 1958).  
This early work was criticised by structuralists as being theoretically deficient, and in reply 
Williams set out 'cultural materialism' as an alternative to structuralism and Althusserian 
Marxism.  Cultural materialism can be summarised as having two main tenets.  First, it 
rejects the separation of culture from the rest of human activity.  Human beings are 
members of a society and in part made by that society; their activities reproduce that 
society and may in some cases change it.  Culture has the constitutive functions of binding 
together the members of a society and preserving social institutions.  All human beings are 
members of societies and all human behaviour is cultural.  At times it may be convenient to 
pick out certain cultural activities - the arts - as a separate object of study, but this should 
not override the understanding that culture is 'ordinary' (Williams 1989).  Second, the 
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means of cultural reproduction are material.  It is inaccurate to depict culture as the 
transmission of ideas without any contact with the material world.  The arts, education and 
communications are contingent on the prevailing material circumstances.  The most idealist 
and esoteric of high culture and the most mundane and humdrum of everyday life are both 
grounded in the material world: no behaviour is aloof from its material and social context.  
Together, these two tenets of cultural materialism mean that culture and the economy are, 
of necessity, intertwined.  Cultural theorists have to look towards the material concerns of 
economics, and economists have to be conscious of the pervasiveness of culture. 
 
    Cultural materialism goes further than classical Marxian views by spreading its 
materialism deeper into the territory of culture.  Classical Marxism, when treating culture 
as a superstructural phenomenon, says little about the means by which culture and ideology 
are propagated.  There is no intention to be idealist, but there is a latent idealism in the way 
that culture is kept on a separate level from material production.  The base/superstructure 
model recalls the idealist division between economics and culture, notwithstanding the 
Marxian claim to have tethered culture to material production.  Marxian writers, in 
upholding materialism, have tended to lose interest in culture and relegate it to a secondary 
importance.  Cultural materialism, by contrast, increases the importance of culture and 
expands the domain of material production into areas seldom discussed by Marxian writers. 
 
    In a different sense, cultural materialism is weaker than Marxian forms of materialism.  
The historical materialism of classical Marxian thought goes beyond a statement about the 
nature of the world; it argues that material production is the driving force of history.  
Changes in technology will, when they come into conflict with social institutions, bring 
about changes in the institutions and the ideology that justifies them.  Material production 
takes precedence over ideas as a cause of change.  The definition of cultural materialism 
carries with it no such assumption that social changes are always determined by material 
production.  For classical Marxists this is a relaxing of the full-blooded Marxian position 
and, hence, a failing (Eagleton 1989).  For others a flexible attitude to the causal role of 
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material production is an advantage, as it deters the more reductive and mechanistic 
accounts of history.  The connections with Marxism are clear, but the cultural materialist 
framework can accommodate a diversity of social theories. 
 
    How does the literary version of cultural materialism compare with the anthropological 
version?  Neither Harris nor Williams cites the other's work, yet the two versions are 
broadly compatible; they are converging on the same middle ground.  The anthropological 
version begins with a materialist analysis of everyday life and then invokes cultural 
questions, while the literary version begins with an idealist analysis of high culture and then 
relates it to the material, everyday world.  These different origins underlie the differences of 
emphasis in the two versions of cultural materialism.  The anthropological version defines a 
scientific research programme in anthropology and thereby endorses particular formal 
methods and a particular theoretical perspective.  Its materialism goes as far as to give 
causal priority to material considerations, although the extent of this priority has proved 
contentious.  The literary version of cultural materialism is more usually applied to artistic 
activities, despite the breadth of its definition, and is not in general seen as defining a 
tightly specified scientific research programme.  It is addressed to a narrower range of 
activities than the anthropological version, but is more pluralistic in the methods it can 
embrace.  Fundamentally, however, the two definitions are the same: they both proclaim 
the importance of culture and its relationship with the material world.  The concept of 
cultural materialism is wider than its applications in anthropology and cultural studies, 
which conform to standard disciplinary divisions.  Cultural materialism spans all human 
activity, including economic behaviour, and has relevance for economics.  Institutional 
economists have long been aware of the importance of culture, and their work has 
frequently been in the spirit of cultural materialism. 
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Culture in institutional economics 
 
An institutional approach to economics can conceivably do without a concept of culture by, 
say, explaining institutions individualistically or representing them as an immutable 
structure.  Usually, though, it will have to consider the formation and reproduction of 
institutions and thus broach cultural questions.  The centrality of culture is evident in the 
writings of Veblen and Commons, and has been maintained in most subsequent 
institutional economics.  An exception is the 'new institutionalism', which has the 
reductionist objective of explaining institutions as the outcome of rational individual 
behaviour (Hodgson 1989; Rutherford, 1989, 1994; Dugger 1990).  A research programme 
with this objective neglects the formation of individuals in society and departs from the 
interests of the 'old institutionalism' (Mayhew 1987a).  The cultural element of institutional 
economics would be lost if it ever became subsumed under the neoclassical desire to 
explain institutions individualistically.  In saying that culture is a core concept for 
institutional economics, one may have to exclude the recent 'new institutionalist' writings.  
This still leaves a large body of current work following in the tradition of the 'old 
institutionalism'. 
 
    Much of the work undertaken in the 'old institutionalist' tradition has resembled 
anthropology in its subject matter and methods (Mayhew 1987b).  Veblen's The Theory of 
the Leisure Class, for example, is as much an anthropological as an economic study, and 
the same can be said of many other institutionalist writings.  There are several respects in 
which institutional economics and anthropology resemble each other.  They both ascribe a 
prime importance to culture and regard it as governing everyday life, not just artistic 
activities.  They both stress the interrelation between ideas and the material world and 
hence avoid extreme forms of idealism.  Both have seen themselves as scientific and 
emulated the empirical methods of the natural sciences.  In the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century, both took an explicitly evolutionary view, although the 
'evolutionary science' of Veblen (1919) was less deterministic than the evolutionary 
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theories of anthropologists such as Tylor and Morgan.  During the twentieth century both 
have moved away from evolutionary views towards more static, relativistic approaches, but 
there are signs that both are regaining an interest in evolution (Hodgson 1993: Chapter 2).  
A few anthropologists have chosen to align themselves with neoclassical economics and 
adopt individualistic modes of thought which are closer to the 'new' than the 'old' 
institutionalism (Mayhew 1989).  The individualistic, market-oriented stance is found 
primarily in the sub-discipline of economic anthropology, where the influence of 
neoclassical economics has been strongest.  Anthropology is a reverse image of economics: 
a belief in the pervasiveness of culture is the majority, mainstream opinion, whereas in 
economics it is a minority opinion defended by the 'old institutionalism' and other 
heterodox schools of thought. 
 
    On some interpretations, the 'old institutionalism' should ally itself with the humanities 
and repudiate attempts to emulate the natural sciences.  Mirowski (1987) has argued that 
the philosophical basis of institutional economics is Peirce's anti-positivist pragmatism.  
This saw the social sciences as interpretative rather than purely empirical and made a sharp 
contrast with the positivism of most early-twentieth-century social science.  Later 
institutionalist writings have been positivistic and empirically based, which has diluted the 
early anti-positivist flavour of institutionalism.  For Mirowski, the true vocation of 
institutionalism is to preserve Peircian anti-positivism, follow more interpretative methods 
and disown the desire to build a natural science of society.  Otherwise, institutionalism will 
be repeating the mistakes of neoclassical economics in borrowing theories and methods 
from the natural sciences (Mirowski 1989).  Inapt analogies taken mainly from physics 
have, in Mirowski's opinion, held back the progress of economics and forced it into 
restrictive, unsuitable types of equilibrium theorising; the same fate could befall 
institutional economics if it relies too heavily on natural scientific analogies.  
Institutionalism can forge a distinctive character by concentrating on the interpretative 
issues at the heart of the anti-naturalistic, literary view of culture and relaxing the 
aspirations to natural scientific status. 
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    The placing of the 'old institutionalism' on the interpretative side of the anti-naturalistic 
division is by no means self-evident.  Veblen and the early institutionalists were aware of 
cultural matters and the ties between economics and culture, but they were also keen to 
establish economics as a science and, in particular, as an evolutionary science (Veblen 
1919).  Culture and evolution can create tensions when brought together.  Once evolution 
takes a cultural form, it can easily be construed as having a purposiveness or teleology and 
following a grand developmental plan.  Knowledge and values can be passed from one 
generation to the next, so that continuous progress seems assured: societies will increase in 
complexity, productivity will rise and living standards will improve.  Many writers have 
felt confident enough to map out the whole course of human history in a series of stages 
moving towards a consummation in a final ideal state.  Marx's account of the stages of 
history is the best-known example, but many nineteenth-century social theorists devised 
similar grand schemes.  For Veblen, an evolutionary science should renounce this sort of 
grand teleological argument.  Evolution has no guiding hand.  An evolutionary approach to 
economics appears to contradict the cultural approaches which assume that the planned, 
purposeful components in evolution will ensure progress. 
 
    The conflict between cultural and evolutionary approaches is largely illusory.  It is quite 
possible to have socioeconomic evolution that incorporates purposeful human behaviour 
and can be studied through interpretative methods (among others).  The evolution of an 
economy is complex enough to embody cultural and non-cultural evolution, along with 
purposeful and non-purposeful human behaviour.  Appealing to evolution need not 
emasculate human agency.  An evolutionary science, as described by Veblen, serves only to 
rule out a universal design determining the present and future course of the economy.  Most 
cultural approaches, although they highlight purposeful human behaviour, stop short of 
claiming that social change is determined by perfect, conscious, unified human planning.  
Intentional human behaviour is too diverse and fragmented to be a perfect guiding hand for 
economic development.  Grand teleologies usually have an exogenous, non-human source: 
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a supernatural deity, a natural force of history or, for some economists, the invisible hand of 
the market. Renouncing these grand teleologies does not entail renouncing purposeful 
human behaviour or the importance of culture. 
 
    An economy is partly but not wholly the outcome of human design.  Interpretative 
methods are of value to economics, and neglected by the mainstream, but it is mistaken to 
suggest that on their own they could provide a full understanding of the economy.  
Likewise, the removal of purposeful behaviour from economics in the interests of denying 
teleology is equivalent to subordinating humanity to nature and denying the human or 
social quality of economics.  One view is too humanistic; the other is not humanistic 
enough.  Resolving the tension between anti-naturalistic accounts of culture and naturalistic 
accounts of evolution requires a view of reality that situates humanity within material 
nature and yet acknowledges the existence of human agency and its role, through culture, in 
the creation of society and the economy.  Such a view of reality is put forward in cultural 
materialism. 
 
 
 
The relevance of cultural materialism to economics 
 
Separating culture from material nature is damaging for both social and natural sciences.  
Even the most physical of natural sciences, which might seem remote from cultural issues, 
cannot be studied without a cultural element entering into the practice of science.  Recent 
philosophy of science has appreciated the inevitability of this (Beed 1991).  The new views 
of scientific method have become well known among natural scientists over the last twenty 
to thirty years, but they have made little impression on neoclassical economists.  
Economics, however, has more reason than the natural sciences to look towards culture; as 
a social science it has a subject matter imbued with cultural questions.  Having to address 
them without mentioning culture is an arbitrary and harmful restriction on economic 
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discussion.  The restriction can be removed by placing economics, along with the rest of 
human activity (including the practice of the natural sciences), within a general framework 
of cultural materialism. 
 
    The form taken by cultural materialism is ontological: it is a statement about the 
presupposed nature of reality.  On its own it does not provide explanations, and to do so 
necessitates more detailed explanatory theorising.  Marxian theory, for example, can be 
seen as a type of cultural materialism that singles out the material forces of production as 
the prime mover of history.  Material production, in Marxian theory, has a causal influence 
over human behaviour which is absent from the definition of cultural materialism.  
Alternative views, allowing ideas and beliefs to react backward on to material production, 
are quite consistent with a cultural materialist perspective: causality can be complex enough 
to preclude unicausal explanations.  Cultural materialism stipulates only that ideas are 
secondary to material nature, in the sense that they cannot exist without it.  One can 
imagine a material nature without human ideas, and indeed without humanity (which has 
been the case for most of the history of the Earth), but one cannot readily imagine human 
ideas without material nature.  To give ideas priority would be anthropocentric and 
exaggerate humanity's modest standing within nature.  A similar relation exists between 
individuals and the society of which they are members: the society does not depend on the 
existence of any particular person, but each person's existence depends on the society.  In 
ontological terms, every individual has to have a social context, and every society a 
material or natural context.  Culture represents the first of these relations, and materialism 
represents the second.  Adherence to cultural materialism denotes an acceptance of the 
wider context of individual behaviour. 
 
    The relations between individuals, society and nature outlined here may seem 
platitudinous, but much natural and social science, under the influence of positivism, has 
ignored them.  Positivism resists making metaphysical statements, however mild or 
unrestrictive, so there can be no explicit presuppositions about the nature of reality.  The 
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case for a more careful treatment of the nature of reality is associated with scientific realist 
philosophy (Harré 1970; Bhaskar, 1978, 1979).  For a scientific enterprise to be well 
founded it has to have a presupposed object of enquiry: there has to be something to be 
studied that is not defined solely by the act of studying it.  Reality has to exist 
independently of human efforts to observe or interpret it.  Metaphysics or ontology is 
thereby made distinct from epistemology.  Otherwise human activities in acquiring 
knowledge will supply their own implicit metaphysics, creating an anthropocentrism 
founded on observation (in the positivistic natural sciences) or interpretation (in the 
culturally based humanities).  Scientific realism wards off these anthropocentric 
inclinations by positing an explicit metaphysics which accords humanity its due place 
within nature.  This need not weaken science or adulterate it with superstitious or 
supernaturalist ideas; on the contrary, it can strengthen science by clarifying the 
presuppositions on which it rests.  Realism is a defence against relativistic or irrationalist 
extremes.  Through a sophisticated scientific realism, one can take account of cultural 
issues without falling back into ontological relativism. 
 
    Cultural materialism, as defined in the present paper, is a qualified naturalism and 
materialism.  It gives rise to a 'critical naturalism', in which the interpretative qualities of 
the social sciences are integrated with a naturalistic outlook rooting both natural and social 
sciences in material nature (Bhaskar 1979).  Social and natural sciences share the aim of 
investigating nature, in spite of the more interpretative methods required by the social 
sciences.  The difference is only one of degree: all sciences are interpretative, but the social 
sciences involve multiple interpretations because human beings are the objects of 
investigation, as well as the investigators.  Greater interpretative complexity means that 
social sciences are more difficult than the natural sciences and demand greater diversity and 
pluralism of method.  Clearly there are some differences between social and natural 
sciences, but at the most fundamental level they can make the same presuppositions about 
reality.  By assuming the existence of a sufficiently complex reality, the social and natural 
sciences can have a single ontological framework.  The presupposed materialism wishes 
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only to give nature an ontological priority over humanity; although theories of nature are 
human artefacts, nature itself exists independently of human activities.  To encompass the 
special character of the social sciences, the materialism cannot be reductionist.  Human 
beings are assumed to have emergent powers: their actions emerge from material nature, 
without being wholly reducible to it.  The materialism carries no implication that material 
considerations always dominate behaviour.  Human societies and culture are emergent from 
nature, not dictated by it. 
 
    Most neoclassical economists are indifferent to methodology and few, if any, have been 
alert to the development of realist approaches in the natural and social sciences.  Outside 
the mainstream, however, a number of economists have argued that economics, like the 
other social sciences, can benefit from scientific realism (Lawson 1989, 1994; Mäki 1989, 
1990; Dow 1990).  Any scientific study must have a presupposed object of enquiry and, if 
this is not made explicit, it will be implicit in the methods adopted; the realist view is that it 
is better to make one's realism explicit.  An explicit ontology has several advantages.  It 
clarifies that social science is a realist undertaking and rules out the irrealist and 
anti-scientific views which have come to the fore in certain brands of postmodernism.  It 
offsets the tendency for ontology to become conflated with epistemology, so that a distinct 
ontological dimension is lost.  It can also, by taking a non-reductionist form, help to sustain 
a qualified naturalism that delineates the similarities and differences between the natural 
and social sciences.  Economists have generally followed a naturalistic line, but their 
naturalism has rarely been made explicit and has taken a narrow, positivistic form (Jackson 
1995).  Cultural materialism, when serving as an ontology, can provide a non-reductionist 
framework within which further theoretical and empirical work can be undertaken.  It is not 
the only non-reductionist social theory that might fulfil an ontological role, and other, 
similar approaches have been formulated in recent years: examples are Bhaskar's 
'transformational model of social activity' (Bhaskar 1979) and Giddens's 'structuration 
theory' (Giddens 1984).  While these theories differ in detail and terminology, each of them 
has the aim of overcoming the structure-agency dualism and each could serve as a 
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non-reductionist ontological framework for the social sciences.  An advantage of cultural 
materialism over the other approaches is that its interdisciplinary character is confirmed by 
its separate appearance in anthropology and literary studies.  The fact that the same outlook 
has appeared independently in two different disciplines suggests that it has a wider 
importance for social science. 
 
    Cultural materialism extends the cultural and material realms to cover the entire breadth 
of human behaviour.  All behaviour is cultural, and all behaviour is emergent from material 
nature.  By this yardstick, the separation of economics from the rest of the social sciences 
has little justification: it may be expedient to hive off the 'economy' for reasons of academic 
specialisation but this has no ontological warrant.  A cultural materialist perspective can 
contribute to economics by putting an end to the culture/economics division and 
underpinning the traditional interest of institutional economists in cultural matters.  It offers 
a means of bringing culture into economics while keeping an essentially naturalistic stance. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The notion of cultural materialism seeks to ease the tensions between cultural and 
economic thought and, more generally, to bridge the anti-naturalistic gap between culture 
and nature.  When viewed ontologically, it can place the social sciences on the same 
footing as the natural sciences and unite them in a qualified naturalism.  A cultural 
materialist perspective is open enough to tolerate individual agency, social structure and 
human biology as distinct influences on economic or other behaviour.  The influences 
interact with each other, and in different times and places different influences may 
predominate.  The intention is to discourage the reductionism that has marred so much 
social theorising and economics in particular. 
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    This accords with the 'old' institutional economics.  Institutionalism can protect itself 
from reductionist pressures by adhering more explicitly to a cultural materialist view.  
Under the same materialist umbrella can come attempts to draw parallels between 
economics and the natural sciences, as well as attempts to draw parallels with the 
humanities.  Both have value, and to exclude either at the most fundamental ontological 
level would be unnecessarily restrictive.  Institutional economists, in investigating the 
relationships between economics, the natural sciences and the humanities, have shown that 
they recognise the unity of the sciences and the complexity of economic issues.  One way 
to formalise this outlook is to embrace cultural materialism. 
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